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Abstract
Convex relaxations are effective for training and
certifying neural networks against norm-bounded
adversarial attacks, but they leave a large gap be-
tween certifiable and empirical robustness. In
principle, convex relaxation can provide tight
bounds if the solution to the relaxed problem is
feasible for the original non-convex problem. We
propose two regularizers that can be used to train
neural networks that yield tighter convex relax-
ation bounds for robustness. In all of our experi-
ments, the proposed regularizers result in higher
certified accuracy than non-regularized baselines.
1. Introduction
Neural networks have achieved excellent performances on
many computer vision tasks, but they are often vulnerable
to small, adversarially chosen perturbations that are barely
perceptible to humans while having a catastrophic impact
on model performance (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow
et al., 2014). Making classifiers robust to these adversarial
perturbations is of great interest, especially when neural
networks are applied to safety-critical applications. Several
heuristic methods exist for obtaining robust classifiers, how-
ever powerful adversarial examples can be found against
most of these defenses (Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Uesato
et al., 2018).
Recent studies focus on verifying or enforcing the certified
accuracy of deep classifiers, especially for networks with
ReLU activations. They provide guarantees of a network’s
robustness to any perturbation δ with norm bounded by
‖δ‖p ≤  (Wong & Kolter, 2017; Wong et al., 2018; Raghu-
nathan et al., 2018; Dvijotham et al., 2018b; Zhang et al.,
2018; Salman et al., 2019). Formal verification methods can
find the exact minimum adversarial distortions needed to
fool a classifier (Ehlers, 2017; Katz et al., 2017; Tjeng et al.,
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2017), but require solving an NP-hard problem. To make
verification efficient and scalable, convex relaxations are
adopted, resulting in a lower bound on the norm of adversar-
ial perturbations (Zhang et al., 2018; Weng et al., 2018), or
an upper bound on the robust error (Dvijotham et al., 2018b;
Gehr et al., 2018; Singh et al., 2018). Linear programming
(LP) relaxations (Wong et al., 2018) are efficient enough to
estimate the lower bound of the margin in each iteration for
training certifiably robust networks. However, due to the
relaxation of the underlying problem, a wide gap remains
between the optimal values from the original and relaxed
problems (Salman et al., 2019).
In this paper, we focus on improving the certified robustness
of neural networks trained with convex relaxation bounds.
To achieve this, we first give a more interpretable explana-
tion for the bounds achieved in (Weng et al., 2018; Wong
et al., 2018). Namely, the constraints of the relaxed prob-
lem are defined by a simple linear network with adversaries
injecting bounded perturbations to both the input of the net-
work and the pre-activations of intermediate layers. The
optimal solution of the relaxed problem can be written as a
forward pass of the clean image through the linear network,
plus the cumulative adversarial effects of all the perturba-
tions added to the linear transforms, which makes it easier
to identify the optimality conditions and serves as a bridge
between the relaxed problem and the original non-convex
problem. We further identify conditions for the bound to be
tight, and we propose two indicators for the gap between
the original non-convex problem and the relaxed problem.
Adding the proposed indicators into the loss function results
in classifiers with better certified accuracy.
2. Background and Related Work
Adversarial defenses roughly fall into two categories: heuris-
tic defenses and verifiable defenses. The heuristic defenses
either try to identify adversarial examples and remove ad-
versarial perturbations from images, or make the network
invariant to small perturbations through training (Papernot
& McDaniel, 2018; Shan et al., 2019; Samangouei et al.,
2018; Hwang et al., 2019). In addition, adversarial training
uses adversarial examples as opposed to clean examples dur-
ing training, so that the network can learn how to classify
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adversarial examples directly (Madry et al., 2017; Shafahi
et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2019).
In response, a line of works have proposed to verify the
robustness of neural nets. Exact methods obtain the pertur-
bation δ with minimum ‖δ‖p such that f(x) 6= f(x + δ),
where f is a classifier and x is the data point. Neverthe-
less, the problem itself is NP-hard and the methods can
hardly scale (Cheng et al., 2017; Lomuscio & Maganti,
2017; Dutta et al., 2018; Fischetti & Jo, 2017; Tjeng et al.,
2017; Scheibler et al., 2015; Katz et al., 2017; Carlini et al.,
2017; Ehlers, 2017).
A body of work focuses on relaxing the non-linearities in the
original problem into linear inequality constraints (Singh
et al., 2018; Gehr et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2018; Mirman
et al., 2018), sometimes using the dual of the relaxed prob-
lem (Wong & Kolter, 2017; Wong et al., 2018; Dvijotham
et al., 2018b). Recently, (Salman et al., 2019) unified the
primal and dual views into a common convex relaxation
framework, and suggested there is an inherent gap between
the actual and the lower bound of robustness given by ver-
ifiers based on LP relaxations, which they called a convex
relaxation barrier.
Some defense approaches integrate the verification methods
into the training of a network to minimize robust loss di-
rectly. (Hein & Andriushchenko, 2017) uses a local lipschitz
regularization to improve certified robustness. In addition,
a bound based on semi-definite programming (SDP) relax-
ation was developed and minimized as the objective (Raghu-
nathan et al., 2018). (Wong & Kolter, 2017) presents an
upper bound on the robust loss caused by norm-bounded
perturbation via LP relaxation, and minimizes this upper
bound during training. (Wong et al., 2018) further extend
this method to much more general network structures with
skip connections and general non-linearities, and provide a
memory-friendly training strategy using random projections.
Since LP relaxation is adopted, the aforementioned convex
relaxation barrier exists for their methods.
While another line of work (IBP) have shown that an in-
tuitively looser interval bound can be used to train much
more robust networks than convex relaxation for large `∞
perturbations (Gowal et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2020), it
is still important to study convex relaxation bounds since
it can provide better certificates against a broader class of
adversaries that IBP struggles to certify in some cases, such
as `2 adversaries for convolutional networks. We discuss
these motivations in more detail in Appendix F.
We seek to enforce the tightness of the convex relaxation
certificate during training. We reduce the optimality gap
between the original and the relaxed problem by using
various tightness indicators as regularizers during training.
Compared with previous approaches, we have the follow-
ing contributions: First, based upon the same relaxation
in (Weng et al., 2018), we illustrate a more intuitive view
for the bounds on intermediate ReLU activations achieved
by (Wong et al., 2018), which can be viewed as a linear
network facing adversaries adding that make bounded per-
turbations to both the input and the intermediate layers. Sec-
ond, starting from this view, we identify conditions where
the bound from the relaxed problem is tight for the original
non-convex problem. Third, based on the conditions, we
propose regularizers that encourage the bound to be tight
for the obtained network, which improves the certificate on
both MNIST and CIFAR-10.
3. Problem Formulation
In general, to train an adversarially robust network, we solve
a constrained minimax problem where the adversary tries to
maximize the loss given the norm constraint, and the param-
eters of the network are trained to minimize this maximal
loss. Due to nonconvexity and the complexity of neural
networks, it is expensive to solve the inner max problem
exactly. To obtain certified robustness, like many related
works (Wong et al., 2018; Gowal et al., 2018), we minimize
an upper bound of the inner max problem, which is a cross
entropy loss on the negation of the lower bounds of margins
over each other class, as shown in Eq. 3. Without loss of gen-
erality, in this section we analyze the original and relaxed
problems for minimizing the margin between the ground
truth class y and some other class t under norm-bounded
adversaries, which can be adapted directly to compute the
loss in Eq. 3.
The original nonconvex constrained optimization problem
for finding the norm-bounded adversary that minimizes the
margin can be formulated as
minimize
z1∈Bp,(x)
c>t xL, (O)
subject to zi+1 = σ(xi), xi = fi(zi),
for i = 1, ..., L,
where ct = ey − et, ey and et are one-hot vectors cor-
responding to the label y and some other class t, σ(·) is
the ReLU activation, and fi is one functional block of
the neural network. This can be a linear layer (fi(zi) =
Wizi + bi), or even a residual block. We use hi(x) =
fi(σ(fi−1(· · · f1(x)))) to denote the ReLU network up to
the i-th layer, and p∗O to denote the optimal solution to O.
3.1. Efficient Convex Relaxations
Grouping of ReLU Activations The nonconvexity of O
stems from the nonconvex feasible set given by the ReLU
activations. Since the network is a continuous function, the
pre-activations xi have lower and upper bounds xi and x¯i
when the input z1 ∈ Bp,(x). If a certain pre-activation
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Figure 1. The feasible sets (blue regions/lines) given by the bounded ReLU constraints (Eq. O), convex hull (convij) and the relaxation
(Fast-Lin) discussed in this paper (specific choice for Eq. C) for j ∈ Ii. The red lines and dots are the intersections between the boundaries
of the convex feasible sets and the ReLU constraints.
xij has xij < 0 < x¯ij , its corresponding ReLU constraint
zi+1,j = σ(xij) gives rise to a non-convex feasible set as
shown in the left of Figure 1, making Eq. O a non-convex
optimization problem. On the other hand, if x¯ij ≤ 0 or
xij ≥ 0, the constraints degenerate into linear constraints
zi+1,j = 0 and zi+1,j = xij respectively, which do not
affect convexity. Based on xi and x¯i, we divide the ReLU
activations into three disjoint subsets
I−i = {j|x¯ij ≤ 0}, I+i = {j|xij ≥ 0},
Ii = {j|xij < 0 < x¯ij}. (1)
If j ∈ Ii, we call the corresponding ReLU activation an
unstable neuron.
Convex relaxation expands the non-convex feasible sets
into convex ones and solves a convex optimization problem
C. The feasible set of O is a subset of the feasible set
of C, so the optimal value of C lower bounds the optimal
value of Eq. O. Moreover, we want problem C to be solved
efficiently, better with a closed form solution, so that it can
be integrated into the training process.
Computational Challenge for the “optimal” Relaxation
As pointed out by (Salman et al., 2019), the optimal layer-
wise convex relaxation, i.e., the optimal convex relaxation
for the nonlinear constraint zi+1 = σ(xi) of a single layer,
can be obtained independently for each neuron. For each
j ∈ Ii in a ReLU network, the optimal layer-wise con-
vex relaxation is the closed convex hull convij of Sij =
{(xij , zi+1,j)|j ∈ Ii, zi+1,j = max(0, xij), xij ≤ xij ≤
xij}, which is just convij = {(xij , zi+1,j)|max(0, xij) ≤
zi+1,j ≤ xijxij−xij (xij −xij)}, corresponding to the triangle
region in the middle of Figure 1. Despite being relatively
tight, there is no closed-form solution to this relaxed prob-
lem. LP solvers are typically adopted to solve a linear
programming problem for each neuron. Therefore, such a
relaxation is hardly scalable to verify larger networks with-
out any additional trick (like (Xiao et al., 2018)). (Weng
et al., 2018) find it to be 34 to 1523 times slower than Fast-
Lin, and it has difficulty verifying MLPs with more than 3
layers on MNIST. In (Salman et al., 2019), it takes 10,000
CPU cores to parallelize the LP solvers for bounding the
activations of every neuron in a two-hidden-layer MLP with
100 neurons per layer. Since solving LP problems for all
neurons are usually impractical, it is even more difficult
to optimize the network to maximize the lower bounds of
margin found by solving this relaxation problem, as differ-
entiating through the LP optimization process is even more
expensive.
Computationally Efficient Relaxations In the layer-
wise convex relaxation, instead of using a boundary non-
linear in xij , (Zhang et al., 2018) has shown that for any
nonlinearity, when both the lower and upper boundaries are
linear in xij , there exist closed-form solutions to the relaxed
problem, which avoids using LP solvers and improves ef-
ficiency. Specifically, the following relaxation of O has
closed-form solutions:
minimize c>t xL, (C)
subject to ai · xi + bi ≤ zi+1 ≤ a¯i · xi + b¯i,
xi ≤ xi ≤ x¯i,
xi = Wizi + bi,
for i = 1, ..., L, z1 ∈ Bp,(x),
where · denotes element-wise product, and for simplicity,
we have only considered networks with no skip connections,
and represent both Full Connected and Convolutional Layers
as a linear transform fi(zi) = Wizi + bi.
Before we can solve C to get the lower bound of margin,
we need to know the range [xi, x¯i] for the pre-activations
xi. As in (Wong & Kolter, 2017; Weng et al., 2018; Zhang
et al., 2018), we can solve the same optimization problem
for each neuron xij starting from layer 1 to L, by replacing
ct with ej or −ej for xij or x¯ij respectively.1
The most efficient approach in this category is Fast-
Lin (Weng et al., 2018), which sets aij = a¯ij , as shown in
the right of Figure 1. A tighter choice is CROWN (Zhang
et al., 2018), which chooses different aij and a¯ij such that
the convex feasible set is minimized. However, CROWN
1For x¯ij , take an extra negation on the solution.
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has much higher complexity than Fast-Lin due to its varying
slopes. We give detailed analysis of the closed-form solu-
tions of both bounds and their complexities in Appendix D.
Recently, CROWN-IBP (Zhang et al., 2020) has been pro-
posed to provide a better initialization to IBP, which uses
IBP to estimate range [xi, x¯i] for CROWN. In this case,
both CROWN and Fast-Lin have the same complexity and
CROWN is a better choice.
Figure 2. Illustration of the data distribution and the decision
boundary of the network h2(z1), where Fast-Lin gives the exact
lower bound of the margin for every sample in S1. We assume x0 is
uniformly distributed in S0 ∪ S1, where S0 = {x0|x02 ≤ |x01| −
b, ‖x0‖∞ ≤ 1}, S1 = {x0|x02 ≥ |x01| + b, ‖x0‖∞ ≤ 1}, and
0 < b < 1. The ground-truth label for x0 ∈ S0 and x0 ∈ S1 are 0,
1 respectively. In this case, b = 0.3,  = 0.2, x0 = [0.1, 0.42]T .
4. Tighter Bounds via Regularization
Despite being relatively efficient to compute, Fast-Lin and
CROWN are not even the tightest layer-wise convex relax-
ation. Using tighter bounds to train the networks could
potentially lead to higher certified robustness by preventing
such bounds from over-regularizing the networks.
Nevertheless, there exist certain parameters and inputs such
that the seemingly looser Fast-Lin is tight for O, i.e., the
optimal value of Fast-Lin is the same as O. The immediate
trivial case on can think of is where no unstable neuron ex-
ists for the samples inside the allowed perturbation interval.
In fact, even when unstable neurons exist, the optimal solu-
tion to the relaxed problem can still be a feasible solution
to the original non-convex problem for a significant portion
of input samples . We give an illustrative example where
Fast-Lin is tight for a significant portion of the samples even
when unstable neurons exist, as shown in Figure 2. In this
figure, Fast-Lin is tight at every sample of S1 for the net-
work h1(z2). Please refer to Appendix E for more details
of this example.
It is therefore interesting to check the conditions for Fast-Lin
or CROWN to be tight forO, and enforcing such conditions
during training so that the network can be better verified by
efficient verifiers like Fast-Lin, CROWN, and even IBP.
4.1. Conditions for Tightness
Here we look into conditions that make the optimal value p∗C
of the convex problem C to be equal to p∗O. Let {zi, xi}Li=1
be some feasible solution of C, from which the objective
value of C can be determined as pC = c>t xL. Let {z′i, x′i}Li=1
be some feasible solution of O computed by passing z′1
through the ReLU sub-networks hi(z′1) defined in O, and
denote the resulting feasible objective value as p′O = c
>
t x
′
L.
Generally, for a given network with the set of weights
{Wi, bi}Li=1, as long as the optimal solution {z∗i , x∗i }Li=1
of C is equal to a feasible solution {z′i, x′i}Li=1 of O, we
will have p∗O = p
∗
C , since any feasible p
′
O of O satisfies
p′O ≥ p∗O, and by the nature of relaxation p∗C ≤ p∗O.
Therefore, for a given network and input x, to check the
tightness of the convex relaxation, we can check whether
its optimal solution {z∗i , x∗i }Li=1 is feasible for O. This can
be achieved by passing z∗1 through the ReLU network, and
either directly check the resultant objective value p′O, or
compare {z∗i , x∗i }Li=1 with the resultant feasible solution
{z′i, x′i}Li=1. Further, we can encourage such conditions to
happen during the training process to improve the tightness
of the bound. Based on such mechanisms, we propose two
regularizers to enforce the tightness. Notice such regular-
izers are different from the RS Loss (Xiao et al., 2018)
introduced to reduce the number of unstable neurons, since
we have shown with Appendix E that C can be tight even
when unstable neurons exist.
4.2. A Intuitive Indicator of Tightness: Difference in
Output Bounds
The observation above motivates us to consider the non-
negative value
d(x, δ∗0 ,W, b) = p
′
O(x, δ
∗
0)− p∗C (2)
as an indicator of the difference between {z∗i , x∗i }Li=1 and
{z′i, x′i}Li=1, where p′O(x, δ∗0) = c>t hL(x + δ∗0) is the mar-
gin over class t computed by passing the optimal pertur-
bation δ∗0 for C through the original network. δ∗0 can be
computed efficiently from the optimality condition of Fast-
Lin or CROWN, as demonstrated in Eq. 8. For exam-
ple, when p = ∞, the optimal input perturbation δ∗0 of
C is δ∗0 = −sign(c>t WL:1), which corresponds to sending
z′1 = z
∗
1 = x− sign(c>t WL:1) through the ReLU network;
when p = 2, δ∗0 = − c
>
t WL:1
‖c>t WL:1‖2 , which corresponds to
sending z′1 = z
∗
1 = x−  c
>
t WL:1
‖c>t WL:1‖2 .
The larger d(x, δ∗0 ,W, b) is, the more relaxed C is, and the
higher p∗O − p∗C could be. Therefore, we can regularize
the network to minimize d(x, δ∗0 ,W, b) during training and
maximize the lower-bound of the margin p∗C , so that we can
obtain a network where p∗C is a better estimate of p
∗
O and
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the robustness is better represented by p∗C . Such an indicator
avoids comparing the intermediate variables, which gives
more flexibility for adjustment. It bears some similarities
to knowledge distillation (Hinton et al., 2015), in that it
encourages learning a network whose relaxed lower bound
gives similar outputs of the corresponding ReLU network.
It is worth noting that minimizing d(x, δ∗0 ,W, b) does not
necessarily lead to decreasing p′O(x, δ
∗
0) or increasing p
∗
C .
In fact, both p′O(x, δ
∗
0) and p
∗
C can be increased or decreased
at the same time with their difference decreasing.
The tightest indicator should give the minimum gap p∗O−p∗C ,
where we need to find the optimal perturbation for O. How-
ever, the minimum gap cannot be found in polynomial time,
due to the non-convex nature of O. (Weng et al., 2018) also
proved that there is no polynomial time algorithm to find
the minimum `1-norm adversarial distortion with 0.99 lnn
approximation ratio unless NP=P, a problem equivalent to
finding the minimum margin here.
4.3. A Better Indicator for Regularization: Difference
in Optimal Pre-activations
Despite being intuitive and is able to achieve improvements,
Eq. 2 which enforces similarity between objective values
does not work as good as enforcing similarity between the
solutions {z∗i , x∗i }Li=1 and {z′i, x′i}Li=1 in practice, an ap-
proach we will elaborate below. For both CROWN and
Fast-Lin, unless d(x, δ∗0 ,W, b) = 0, {z∗i , x∗i }Li=1 may devi-
ate a lot from {z′i, x′i}Li=1 and does not correspond to any
ReLU network, even if d(x, δ∗0 ,W, b) may seem small. For
example, it is possible that z∗ij < 0 for a given z
∗
1 , but a
ReLU network will always have z′ij ≥ 0.
We find an alternative regularizer more effective at improv-
ing verifiable accuracy. The regularizer encourages the fea-
sible solution {z′i, x′i}Li=1 of O to exactly match the feasible
optimal solution {z∗i , x∗i }Li=1 of C. Since we are adopting
the layer-wise convex relaxation, the optimal solutions of
the unstable neurons can be considered independently.
Here we derive a sufficient condition for tightness for Fast-
Lin, which also serves as a sufficient condition for CROWN.
For linear programming, the optimal solution occurs on the
boundaries of the feasible set. Since Fast-Lin is a layer-wise
convex relaxation, the solution to each of its neurons in zi
can be considered independently, and therefore for a specific
layer i and j ∈ Ii, the pair of optimal solutions (x∗ij , z∗i+1,j)
should occur on the boundary in the right of Figure 1. It
follows that the only 3 optimal solutions (x∗ij , z
∗
i+1,j) of
C that are also feasible for O are (xij , 0), (xij , xij) and
(0, 0). Notice they are also in the intersection between the
boundary of CROWN and O.
In practice, out of efficiency concerns, both Fast-Lin and
CROWN identify the boundaries that the optimal solution
lies on and computes the optimal value by accumulating
the contribution of each layer in a backward pass, with-
out explicitly computing {z∗i , x∗i }Li=1 for each layer with
a forward pass (see Appendix D for more details). It is
therefore beneficial to link the feasible solutions of O to
the parameters of the boundaries. Specifically, let δ∗ij ∈
{bij , b¯ij} be the intercept of the line that the optimal so-
lution (x∗ij , z
∗
i+1,j) lies on. We want to find a rule based
on {δ∗i }Li=1 to determine whether the bound is tight from
the values of {x′i}Li=1. For both Fast-Lin and CROWN,
bij = 0, b¯ij = −
xijxij
xij−xij . For Fast-Lin, when δ
∗
ij = b¯ij ,
only (x∗ij , z
∗
i+1,j) = (xij , 0) or (xij , xij) are fesible for O;
when δ∗ij = bij , only (x
∗
ij , z
∗
i+1,j) = (0, 0) is feasible forO.
Meanwhile, z′i+1,j = max(x
′
ij , 0) is deterministic if x
′
ij
is given. Therefore, when the bound is tight for Fast-Lin,
if δ∗ij = bij , then x
′
ij = 0. Otherwise, if δ
∗
ij = b¯ij , and
x′ij = xij or xij . For CROWN, this condition is also fea-
sible, though it could be either x′ij ≤ 0 or x′ij ≥ 0 when
δ∗ij = 0, depending on the optimal slope D
(L)
ij .
Indeed, we achieve optimal tightness (p∗C = p
∗
O) for both
Fast-Lin and CROWN if x′ij satisfy these conditions at all
unstable neurons. Specifically,
Proposition 1. Assume {z′i, x′i}Li=1 is obtained by the ReLU
network hL with input z′1, and {δ∗i }L−1i=0 is the optimal solu-
tion of Fast-Lin or CROWN. If z′1 = x+δ
∗
0 , and x
′
ij ∈ S(δ∗ij)
for all i = 1, ..., L− 1, j ∈ Ii, then {z′i, x′i}Li=1 is an opti-
mal solution of O, Fast-Lin and CROWN. Here
S(δ∗ij) =
{
{xij , xij} if δ∗ij = −
xijxij
xij−xij ,
{0} if δ∗ij = 0.
We provide the proof of this simple proposition in the Ap-
pendix.
It remains to be discussed how to best enforce the simi-
larity between the optimal solutions of O and Fast-Lin or
CROWN. Like before, we choose to enforce the similarity
between {x′i}Li=1 and the closest optimal solution of Fast-
Lin, where {x′i}Li=1 is constructed by setting x′1 = x∗1 =
W1(x + δ
∗
0) + b1 and pass x
′
1 through the ReLU network
to obtain x′i = hi(x+ δ
∗
0). By Proposition 1, the distance
can be computed by considering the values of the intercepts
{δ∗i }L−1i=1 as
r(x, δ∗0 ,W, b) =
1∑L−1
i=1 |Ii|
L−1∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ii
δ∗ij=0
|x′ij |
+
∑
j∈Ii
δ∗ij 6=0
min(|x′ij − xij |, |x′ij − xij |)
 ,
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Algorithm 1 Computing the Fast-Lin Bounds and Regularizers for `∞ Norm
Data: Clean images{x(j)}mj=1, ReLU network with parameters W, b, and maximum perturbation .
Result: Margin Lower Bound p∗C , Regularizer d(x, δ∗0 ,W, b) and r(x, δ∗0 ,W, b).
InitializeW1:1 ←W1, g1(x) = W1x+ b1, x1 = g1(x)− ‖W1:1‖1,row, x¯1 = g1(x) + ‖W1:1‖1,row
for i=2,. . . ,L-1 do
Compute Di−1 with Eq. 5,Wi:1 ←WiDi−1Wi−1, gi(x) = WiDi−1gi−1(x) + bi
xi ← gi(x)− ‖Wi:1‖1,row −
∑i−1
i′=1
∑
j∈Ii′
xi′jxi′j
xi′j−xi′j min((Wi:i′+1):,j , 0)
xi ← gi(x) + ‖Wi:1‖1,row +
∑i−1
i′=1
∑
j∈Ii′
xi′jxi′j
xi′j−xi′j min(−(Wi:i′+1):,j , 0)
end
Compute DL−1 with Eq. 5,WL:1 ←WLDL−1WL−1, gL(x) = WLDL−1gL−1(x) + bL
Compute p∗C with Eq. 10, δ
∗
0 ← −‖c>t WL:1‖1,row
x′i ← hi(x+ δ∗0) for i = 1 to L
d(x, δ∗0 ,W, b)← c>t x′L − p∗C
Compute r(x, δ∗0 ,W, b) with Eq. 3
where the first term corresponds to δ∗ij = 0 and the con-
dition x′ij ∈ {0}, and the second term corresponds to
δ∗ij = −
xijxij
xij−xij and the condition x
′
ij ∈ {xij , xij}. To
minimize the second term, the original ReLU network only
needs to be optimized towards the nearest feasible opti-
mal solution. It is easy to see from Proposition 1 that if
r(x, δ∗0 ,W, b) = 0, then p
∗
O = p
∗
C , where C could be both
Fast-Lin or CROWN.
Compared with d(x, δ∗0 ,W, b), r(x, δ
∗
0 ,W, b) puts more con-
straints on the parametersW, b , since it requires all unstable
neurons of the ReLU network to match the optimal solutions
of Fast-Lin, instead of only matching the objective values
p′O and p
∗
C . In this way, it provides stronger guidance to-
wards a network whose optimal solution for O and Fast-Lin
or CROWN agree. However, again, this is not equivalent
to trying to kill all unstable neurons, since Fast-Lin can be
tight even when unstable neurons exist.
4.4. Certified Robust Training in Practice
In practice, for classification problems with more than two
classes, we will compute the lower bound of the margins
with respect to multiple classes. Denote p∗C and p
∗
O as the
concatenated vector of lower bounds of the relaxed problem
and original problem for multiple classes, and dt, rt as the
regularizers for the margins with respect to class t.
Together with the regularizers, we optimize the following
objective
minimize
W,b
LCE(−p∗C , y)+λ
∑
t
dt(x, δ
∗
0 ,W, b)
+ γ
∑
t
rt(x, δ
∗
0 ,W, b), (3)
where LCE(−p∗C , y) is the cross entropy loss with label
y, as adopted by many related works (Wong et al., 2018;
Gowal et al., 2018), and we have implicitly abbreviated the
inner maximization problem w.r.t. {δi}L−1i=0 into the optimal
values p∗C and solution δ
∗
0 . More details for computing the
intermediate and output bounds can be found in Algorithm 1,
where we have used ‖·‖1,row to denote row-wise `1 norm,
and (·):,j for taking the j-th column.
One major challenge of the convex relaxation approach is
the high memory consumption. To compute the bounds
xi, xi, we need to pass an identity matrix with the same
number of diagonal entries as the total dimensions of the
input images, which can make the batch size thousands of
times larger than usual. To mitigate this, one can adopt the
random projection from (Wong et al., 2018), which projects
identity matrices into lower dimensions as Wi:1R to esti-
mate the norm ofWi:1. Such projections add noise/variance
to xi, xi, and the regularizers are affected as well.
5. Experiments
We evaluate the proposed regularizer on two datasets
(MNIST and CIFAR10) with two different  each. We con-
sider only `∞ adversaries. Our implementation is based
on the code released by (Wong et al., 2018) for Convex
Outer Adversarial Polytope (CP), and (Zhang et al., 2020)
for CROWN-IBP, so when λ = γ = 0, we obtain the same
results as CP or CROWN-IBP. We use up to 4 GTX 1080Ti
or 2080Ti for all our experiments.
Architectures: We experiment with a variety of different
network structures, including a MLP (2x100) with two 100-
neuron hidden layers as (Salman et al., 2019), two Conv
Nets (Small and Large) that are the same as (Wong et al.,
2018), a family of 10 small conv nets and a family of 8
larger conv nets, all the same as (Zhang et al., 2020), and
also the same 5-layer convolutional network (XLarge) as
in the latest version of CROWN-IBP (Zhang et al., 2020).
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Dataset Model Base Method  λ γ Rob. Err PGD Err Std. Err
MNIST 2x100, Exact CP 0.1 0 0 14.85% 10.9% 3.65%
MNIST 2x100, Exact CP 0.1 2e-3 1 13.32% 10.9% 4.73%
MNIST Small, Exact CP 0.1 0 0 4.47% 2.4% 1.19%
MNIST Small, Exact CP 0.1 5e-3 5e-1 3.65% 2.2% 1.09%
MNIST - Best of PV1 0.1 - - 4.44% 2.87% 1.20%
MNIST - Best of RS2 0.1 - - 4.40% 3.42% 1.05%
MNIST Small CP 0.1 0 0 4.47% 3.3% 1.19%
MNIST Small CP 0.1 0 5e-1 4.32% 3.4% 1.51%
MNIST Large DAI3 0.1 - - 3.4% 2.4% 1.0%
MNIST 2x100, Exact CP 0.3 0 0 61.39% 49.4% 33.16%
MNIST 2x100, Exact CP 0.3 5e-3 5e-3 56.05% 44.3% 26.10%
MNIST Small, Exact CP 0.3 0 0 31.25% 15.0% 7.88%
MNIST Small, Exact CP 0.3 5e-3 5e-1 29.65% 13.7% 7.28%
MNIST Small CP 0.3 0 0 42.7% 26.0% 15.93%
MNIST Small CP 0.3 2e-3 2e-1 41.36% 24.0% 14.29%
MNIST XLarge IBP4 0.3∗ - - 8.05% 6.12% 1.66%
MNIST XLarge CROWN-IBP 0.3∗ - - 7.01% 5.88% 1.88%
MNIST XLarge CROWN-IBP 0.3∗ 0 5e-1 6.64% - 1.76%
CIFAR10 Small CP 2/255 0 0 53.19% 48.0% 38.19%
CIFAR10 Small CP 2/255 5e-3 5e-1 51.52% 47.0% 37.30%
CIFAR10 Large DAI3 2/255 - - 61.4% 55.6% 55.0%
CIFAR10 XLarge IBP4 2/255∗ - - 49.98% 45.09% 29.84%
CIFAR10 XLarge CROWN-IBP 2/255∗ - - 46.03% 40.28% 28.48%
CIFAR10 Large CP 2/255 0 0 45.78% 38.5% 29.42%
CIFAR10 Large CP 2/255 5e-3 5e-1 45.19% 38.8% 29.76%
CIFAR10 Small CP 8/255 0 0 75.45% 68.3% 62.79%
CIFAR10 Small CP 8/255 1e-3 1e-1 74.70% 67.9% 62.50%
CIFAR10 Large CP 8/255 0 0 74.04% 68.8% 59.73%
CIFAR10 Large CP 8/255 5e-3 5e-1 73.74% 68.5% 59.82%
CIFAR10 XLarge IBP4 8/255∗ - - 67.96% 65.23% 50.51%
CIFAR10 XLarge CROWN-IBP 8/255∗ - - 66.94% 65.42% 54.02%
CIFAR10 XLarge CROWN-IBP 8/255∗ 0 5e-1 66.64% - 53.78%
Table 1. Results on MNIST, and CIFAR10 with small networks, large networks, and different coefficients of d(x, δ∗0 ,W, b), r(x, δ∗0 ,W, b).
All entries with positive λ or γ are using our regularizers. For all models not marked as “Exact”, we have projected the input dimension of
Wi:1 to 50, the same as (Wong et al., 2018). For  values with ∗, larger  is used for training.  = 0.3, 2/255, 8/255 correspond to using
 = 0.4, 2.2/255, 8.8/255 for training respectively. For the methods: 1: (Dvijotham et al., 2018a); 2: (Xiao et al., 2018); 3: (Mirman
et al., 2018); 4 (Gowal et al., 2018).
The Small convnet has two convolutional layers of 16, 32
output channels each and two FC layers with 100 hidden
neurons. The Large convnet has four Conv layers with 32,
32, 64 and 64 output channels each, plus three FC layers
of 512 neurons. The XLarge convnet has five conv lyaers
with 64, 64, 128, 128, 128 output channels each, with two
FC layers of 512 neurons.
Hyper-parameters: For experiments on CP, we use
Adam (Kingma & Ba, 2014) with a learning rate of 10−3
and no weight decay. Like (Wong et al., 2018), we train
the models for 80 epochs, where in the first 20 epochs the
learning rate is fixed but the  increases from 0.01/0.001 to
its maximum value for MNIST/CIFAR10, and in the follow-
ing epochs, we reduce learning rate by half every 10 epochs.
Unless labelled with “Exact” in the model names of Table 1,
we use random projection as in (Wong et al., 2018) for CP
experiments to reduce the memory consumption. Due to the
noisy estimation of the optimal solutions from these random
projections, we also adopt a warm-up schedule for the regu-
larizers in all CP experiments to prevent over-regularization,
where λ, γ increases form 0 to the preset values in the first
20 epochs.
For CROWN-IBP, we use the updated expensive training
schedule as (Zhang et al., 2020), which uses 200 epochs
with batch size 256 for MNIST and 3200 epochs with batch
size 1024 for CIFAR10. We also use the afore-mentioned
warm up schedule for λ, γ.
5.1. Improving Convex Outer Adversarial Polytope
Table 1 shows comparisons with various approaches. All of
our baseline implementations of CP have already improved
upon (Wong et al., 2018). After adding the proposed regular-
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Method error model A model B model C model D model E model F model G model H model I model J
Copied std. (%) 5.97± .08 3.20± 0 6.78± .1 3.70± .1 3.85± .2 3.10± .1 4.20± .3 2.85± .05 3.67± .08 2.35± .09verified (%) 15.4± .08 10.6± .06 16.1± .3 11.3± .1 11.7± .2 9.96± .09 12.2± .6 9.90± .2 11.2± .09 9.21± .3
Baseline std. (%) 5.65± .04 3.23± .3 4.70± .4 2.94± .05 6.39± .3 2.89± .05 4.11± .3 2.55± .1 3.30± .4 2.56± .1verified (%) 14.70± .07 10.65± .3 13.78± 1. 9.89± .3 15.26± .6 9.54± .1 12.06± .9 8.92± .2 10.81± .8 9.67± .4
With r std. (%) 5.80± .04 3.16± .06 5.16± .3 3.06± .05 6.15± .2 2.95± .05 3.83± .2 2.57± .1 3.29± .04 2.73± .4verified (%) 14.54± .07 10.46± .08 13.37± .3 9.91± .3 14.43± .3 9.48± .2 11.01± .5 8.83± .3 10.18± .5 9.49± .4
Table 2. Mean and standard deviation of the family of 10small models on MNIST with  = 0.3. Here we use a cheaper training schedule
with a total of 100 epochs, all in the same setting as the IBP baseline results of (Zhang et al., 2020). Baseline is CROWN-IBP with
epoch=140 and lr decay step=20. Like in CROWN-IBP, we run each model 5 times to compute the mean and standard deviation. “Copied”
are results from (Zhang et al., 2020).
izers, the certified robust accuracy is further improved upon
our baseline in all cases. We also provide results against
a 100-step PGD adversary for our CP models. Since both
PGD errors and standard errors are reduced in most cases,
the regularizer should have improved not only the certified
upper bound, but also improved the actual robust error.
Despite the fact that we start from a stronger baseline,
the relative improvement on 2x100 with our regular-
izer (10.3%/8.7%) are comparable to the improvements
(5.9%/10.0%) under the same setting from (Salman et al.,
2019), which solves for the lower and upper bounds of all
intermediate layers via the tightest layer-wise LP relaxation
(Figure 1). This indicates that the improvement brought by
using our regularizer during training and efficient verifiers
(Fast-Lin in this case) for verification is comparable with
using the expensive and unstable optimal layer-wise convex
relaxation.
Our results with Small are better than the best results
of (Dvijotham et al., 2018a; Xiao et al., 2018) on MNIST
with  = 0.1, though not as good as the best of (Mirman
et al., 2018), which uses a larger model. When applying
the same model on CIFAR10, we achieve better robust error
than (Mirman et al., 2018).
The relative improvements in certified robust error for
 = 0.1 and 0.3 are 18%/3.4% for the small exact model
on MNIST, compared with 0.03%/3.13% for the random
projection counterparts. This is mainly because in the exact
models, we have better estimates of xi, xi. Still, these con-
sistent improvements validate that our proposed regularizers
improve the performance.
We also give ablation studies of the two regularizers in
Appendix B and Table 3.
5.2. Improving CROWN-IBP
In its first stage of training, CROWN-IBP (Zhang et al.,
2020) trains the network with CROWN (Zhang et al., 2018)
to compute the bounds of the final outputs based on the in-
terval bounds of intermediate activations, and in its second
stage, CROWN-IBP uses only IBP. We apply our regular-
izer to the first stage of CROWN-IBP, using interval bounds
to over-approximate xi and x¯i required by our second reg-
ularizer on the optimal pre-activations, to obtain a better
intialization for its second stage, and demonstrate improve-
ments in Table 1.
Methods based on interval bounds, including IBP, CROWN-
IBP and DAI (Mirman et al., 2018), tend to behave not as
good as CP when  is small. Our regularizers are able to
further improve CP on CIFAR10 ( = 2/255), and demon-
strate the best result among all approaches compared in
this setting, as shown in Table 1. To our knowledge, these
are the best results for CIFAR10 ( = 2/255) reported on
comparable sized models. By using our regularizers on
CROWN-IBP to provide a better initialization for the later
training stage of pure IBP, our method also achieves the
best certified accuracy on MNIST ( = 0.3) and CIFAR10 (
 = 8/255).
To verify the significance of the regularizers, Table 2 shows
the mean and variance of the results with the family smaller
models on MNIST, demonstrating consistent improvements
of our model, while Table 4 (in the appendix) gives the
best, median and worst case results with the large models
on the MNIST dataset and compares with both IBP and
CROWN-IBP.
6. Conclusions
We propose two regularizers based on the convex relax-
ation bounds for training robust neural networks that can
be better verified by efficient verifiers including Fast-Lin
and IBP for certifiable robustness. Extensive experiments
validate that the regularizers improve robust accuracy over
non-regularized baselines, and outperform state-of-the-art
approaches. This work is a step towards closing the gap be-
tween certified and empirical robustness. Future directions
include methods to improve computational efficiency for
LP relaxations (and certified methods in general), and better
ways to leverage random projections for acceleration.
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(Appendix)
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1. Assume {z′i, x′i}Li=1 is obtained by the ReLU
network hL with input z′1, and {δ∗i }L−1i=0 is the optimal solu-
tion of Fast-Lin or CROWN. If z′1 = x+δ
∗
0 , and x
′
ij ∈ S(δ∗ij)
for all i = 1, ..., L− 1, j ∈ Ii, then {z′i, x′i}Li=1 is an opti-
mal solution of O, Fast-Lin and CROWN. Here
S(δ∗ij) =
{
{xij , xij} if δ∗ij = −
xijxij
xij−xij ,
{0} if δ∗ij = 0.
Proof. We only need to prove {z′i, x′i}Li=1 is an optimal solu-
tion of both Fast-Lin and CROWN. After that, {z′i, x′i}Li=1 is
both a lower bound and feasible solution ofO, and therefore
is the optimal solution of O.
Here we define x∗i = Wiz
∗
i + bi for i = 1, ..., L, z
∗
i+1 =
D
(L)
i x
∗
i + δ
∗
i for i = 1, ..., L − 1, and z∗1 = x + δ∗0 . By
definition, {x∗i , z∗i }Li=1 is an optimal solution of Fast-Lin or
CROWN. Also, since z∗1 = z
′
1, we have x
′
1 = W1z
∗
1 + b1 =
x∗1. Next, we will prove if the assumption holds, we will
have z′2 = z
∗
2 for both Fast-Lin and CROWN.
For j ∈ I+1 , by definition of Fast-Lin and CROWN,D(L)1j =
1 and x∗1j ≥ x1j > 0, so x′1j = x∗1j ≥ 0, z∗2,j = D(L)1j x∗1j =
x′1j = max(x
′
1j , 0) = z
′
2j .
For j ∈ I−1 , again, by definition, D(L)1j = 0, and x∗1j ≤
x¯1j < 0, so x′1j = x
∗
1j < 0, z
∗
2j = D
(L)
1j x
∗
1j = 0 =
max(x′1j , 0) = z
′
2j .
For j ∈ I1:
• If δ∗1j = 0 and x′1j = 0 as assumed in the conditions,
since z∗1 = z
′
1, we know
x∗1j = W1jz
∗
1 + b1j = W1jz
′
1 + b1j = x
′
1j = 0,
whereW1j is the j-th row ofW1. No matter what value
D
(L)
1j is, z
∗
2,j = D
(L)
1j x
∗
1j = 0, z
′
2j = max(x
′
1j , 0) =
0, the equality still holds.
• If δ∗1,j = −
x¯1jx1j
x¯1j−x1j , for both Fast-Lin and CROWN,
z∗2j = −
x¯1jx1j
x¯1j−x1j (x
∗
1j − x1j). Further, if x′1j ∈
{x1j , x¯1j} as assumed: if x∗1j = x′1j = x1j , then
x′1j < 0, so z
′
2j = max(x
′
1j , 0) = 0, and z
∗
2j =
xij
xij−xij (x¯1j − x1j) = 0 = z
′
2j ; if x
∗
1j = x
′
1j = x¯1j ,
then x′1j > 0, z
′
2j = x
′
1j and z
∗
2j =
xij
xij−xij (x¯1j −
x1j) = x1,j = z
′
2j .
Now we have proved z′2 = z
∗
2 for both Fast-Lin and
CROWN if the assumption is satisfied. Starting from this
layer, using the same argument as above, we can prove
z′3 = z
∗
3 ,...,z
′
L−1 = z
∗
L−1 for both Fast-Lin and CROWN.
As a result, x′L = x
∗
L and c
T
t x
′
L = c
T
t x
∗
L = p
∗
C , where C
can be both Fast-lin and CROWN. Therefore, {z′i, x′i}Li=1 is
an optimal solution of C.
B. Ablation Studies of the Two Regularizers
In this section, we give the detailed results with either λ or γ
set to 0, i.e., we use only one regularizer in each experiment,
in order to compare the effectiveness of the two regularizers.
All the results are with the small model on CIFAR10 with
 = 2/255. The best results are achieved with r(x, δ∗0 ,W, b).
We reasoned in 4.2 that d(x, δ∗0 ,W, b) may not perform
well when random projection is adopted. As shown in the
supplementary, the best robust error achieved under the same
setting when fixing γ = 0 is higher than when fixing λ = 0,
which means r(x, δ∗0 ,W, b) is more resistant to the noise
introduced by random projection. Still, random projections
offer a huge efficiency boost when they are used. How
to improve the bounds while maintaining efficiency is an
important future work.
C. Additional Results on MNIST
See Table 4.
D. Solutions to the Relaxed Problems
In this section, we give more details about the optimal solu-
tions of Fast-Lin (Weng et al., 2018) and CROWN (Zhang
et al., 2018), to make this paper self-contained. Recall
that for layer-wise convex relaxations, each neuron in the
activation layer are independent. {aij , bij , aij , bij} are cho-
sen to bound the activations assuming the lower bound xij
and upper bound x¯ij of the preactivation xij is known. For
j ∈ Ii, aijxij+bij ≤ max(0, xij) ≤ xijxij−xij (xij−xij) ≤
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λ γ Robust Err (%) Std. Err (%) λ γ Robust Err (%) Std. Err (%)
1e-5 0 52.90 37.61 0 1e-3 52.56 37.45
5e-5 0 53.09 37.77 0 5e-3 53.38 38.19
1e-4 0 52.48 37.37 0 1e-2 52.60 37.73
5e-4 0 52.85 37.13 0 2.5e-2 52.70 37.78
1e-3 0 52.61 37.96 0 5e-2 53.13 38.36
2.5e-3 0 53.10 38.24 0 1e-1 52.72 38.22
5e-3 0 52.76 38.15 0 2.5e-1 52.90 38.04
1e-2 0 53.14 38.58 0 5e-1 52.39 37.48
5e-2 0 52.82 39.89 0 1 52.27 38.07
1e-1 0 53.94 41.59 0 2 53.10 38.64
5e-1 0 56.39 48.06
1 0 59.23 52.51
Table 3. Ablation results on CIFAR10 with the small model, where  = 2/255.
Dataset (`∞) Model Family Method
Verified Test Error (%) Standard Test Error (%)
best median worst best median worst
MNIST 0.3
(Gowal et al., 2018) 8.05 - - 1.66 - -
8 large models
CI Orig 7.46 8.47 8.57 1.48 1.52 1.99
CI ReImp 7.99 8.38 8.97 1.40 1.69 2.19
CI Reg 7.26 8.44 8.88 1.51 1.72 2.21
Table 4. Our results on the MNIST dataset, with CROWN-IBP. Here we use a cheaper training schedule with a total of 100 epochs, all in
the same setting as the IBP baseline results of (Zhang et al., 2020). CI Orig are results copied from the paper, CI ReImp are results of our
implementation of CROWN-IBP, and CI Reg is with regularizer r.
aijxij + bij ; for j ∈ I+i , aij = aij = aij = bij = 1; for
j ∈ I−i , aij = aij = bij = bij = 0.
Optimal Solutions of Fast-Lin In Fast-Lin (Weng et al.,
2018), for j ∈ Ii, aij = aij = xijxij−xij , bij = 0, bij =
− xijxijxij−xij , shown as the blue region in the right of Figure 1.
To compute the lower and upper bound xij and xij for
xij , we just need to replace the objective of Eq. C with
c>ijxi, where cij is a one-hot vector with the same number
of entries as xi and the j-th entry being 1 for xij and -1 for
xij (an extra negation is applied to the minimum to get xij).
Such constraints allow each intermediate ReLU activation to
reach their upper or lower bounds independently. As a result,
each intermediate unstable neuron can be seen as an adver-
sary adding a perturbation δij in the range [0,− xijxijxij−xij ] to
a linear transform, represented as zij =
xij
xij−xij xij + δij .
Such a point of view gives rise to a more interpretable ex-
planation for Fast-Lin. If we construct a network from
the relaxed constraints, then the problem becomes how to
choose the perturbations for both the input and intermediate
unstable neurons to minimize c>t xL of a multi-layer linear
network. Such a linear network under the perturbations is
defined as
zi+1 = Dixi+δi, xi = Wizi+bi, for i = 1, ..., L, z1 = x+δ0,
(4)
where Di is a diagonal matrix and δi is a vector. The input
perturbation satisfies ‖δ0‖p ≤ . The j-th diagonal entry
Dij and the j-th entry δij for i > 0 is defined as
Dij =

0, if j ∈ I−i
1, if j ∈ I+i ,
xij
xij−xij , ifj ∈ Ii
δij ∈ Sδij =
{[
0,− xijxijxij−xij
]
, if j ∈ Ii
{0}, otherwise.
(5)
With such an observation, we can further unfold the objec-
tive in Eq. C 4 into a more interpretable form as
c>t xL = c
>
t fL(DL−1fL−1(· · ·D1f1(x)))
+ c>t
L−1∑
i=0
WL
L−1∏
k=i+1
DkWkδi, (6)
where the first term of RHS is a forward pass of the clean
image x through a linear network interleaving between a
linear layer x = Wiz+ bi and a scaling layer z = Dix, and
the second term is the sum of the i-th perturbation passing
through all the weight matrices Wi of the linear operation
layers and scaling layers Di after it.
Therefore, under such a relaxation, only the second term
is affected by the variables {δi}L−1i=0 for optimizing Eq. C.
Denote the linear network up to the i-th layer as gi(x), and
Wi:i′ = Wi
∏i−1
k=i′ DkWk. We can transform Eq. C with
aij = aij =
xij
xij−xij , bij = 0, bij = −
xijxij
xij−xij into the
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following constrained optimization problem
minimize
δ0,...,δL−1
c>t gL(x) +
L−1∑
i=0
c>t WL:i+1δi,
subject to ‖δ0‖p ≤ , δij ∈ Sδij for i = 1, ..., L− 1. (7)
Notice c>t WL:i+1 is just a row vector. For i > 0, j ∈ Ii, to
minimize c>t WL:i+1δij , we let δij be its minimum value 0
if (c>t WL:i+1)j ≥ 0, or its maximum value δij = −
xijxij
xij−xij
if (c>t WL:i+1)j < 0, where (c>t WL:i+1)j is the j-th entry
of c>t WL:i+1. For δ0, when the infinity norm is used, we
set δij = − if (c>t WL:i+1)j ≥ 0, and otherwise δij = .
For other norms, it is also easy to see that
min
‖δ0‖p≤
c>t WL:1δ0 = − max‖δ0‖p≤1−c
>
t WL:1δ0 (8)
= −‖c>t WL:1‖∗, (9)
where ‖·‖∗ is the dual norm of the p norm. In this way, the
optimal value p∗C pC of the relaxed problem (Eq. 7) can be
found efficiently without any gradient step. The optimal
value can be achieved by just treating the input perturbations
and intermediate relaxed ReLU activations as adversaries
against a linear network after them.The resulting expression
for the lower-bound is
p∗O ≥ p∗C = c>t gL(x)− ‖c>t WL:1‖∗
−
L−1∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ii
xijxij
xij − xij
min((c>t WL:i+1)j , 0).
(10)
Though starting from different points of view, it can be
easily proved that the objective derived from a dual view
in (Wong et al., 2018) is the same as Fast-Lin.
Optimal Solution of CROWN The only difference be-
tween CROWN and Fast-Lin is in the choice of aij for
j ∈ Ii. For ReLU activations, CROWN chooses aij = 1
if x¯ij ≥ −xij , or aij = 0 otherwise. This makes the
relaxation tighter than Fast-Lin, but also introduces extra
complexity due to the varying Di. In Fast-Lin, Di is a
constant once the upper and lower bounds x¯i and xi are
given. For CROWN, since 0 < a¯ij < 1, a¯ij 6= aij , Di now
changes with the optimality condition of δi, which depends
on the layer l and the index k of the neuron/logit of interest.
Specifically, for `∞ adversaries, the optimality condition of
δi is determined by c>lkWl:i, so now we have to apply extra
index to the slope as D(l,k)i , as well as the equivalent linear
operator asW(l,k)l:1 . As a result, the optimal solution is now
c>lkgl(x)− ‖c>lkW(l,k)l:1 ‖∗
−
L−1∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ii
xijxij
xij − xij
min((c>lkW(l,k)l:i+1)j , 0).
(11)
This drastically increase the number of computations, espe-
cially when computing the intermediate bounds xi and x¯i,
where we can no longer just compute a singleWl:1 to get
the bound, but have to compute number-of-neuron copies
of it for the different values of D(l,k)i in the intermediate
layers.
Practical Implementations of the Bounds In practice,
the final output bound (also the intermediate bounds) is
computed in a backward pass, since we need to determine
the value (c>lkW(l,k)l:i+1)j to choose the optimal δ∗ij , which
is the multiplication of all linear operators after layer i.
Computing c>lkW(l,k)l:i+1 in a backward pass avoids repeated
computation. It proceeds as
c>lkW(l,k)l:i = c>lkW(l,k)l:i+1D(l,k)i Wi. (12)
E. A Toy Example for Tight Relaxation
Figure 3. Illustration of the data distribution and the decision
boundary of the network. In this case, b = 0.3,  = 0.2, x0 =
[0.1, 0.42]T .
We give an illustrative example where the optimal solu-
tion to the relaxed problem is a feasible solution to the
original non-convex problem for certain input samples
even when unstable neurons exist. It is a binary clas-
sification problem for samples x0 = [x01, x02]T ∈ R2.
We assume x0 is uniformly distributed in S0 ∪ S1, where
S0 = {x0|x02 ≤ |x01| − b, ‖x0‖∞ ≤ 1}, S1 = {x0|x02 ≥
|x01| + b, ‖x0‖∞ ≤ 1}, and 0 < b < 1. The ground-
truth label for x0 ∈ S0 and x0 ∈ S1 are 0, 1 respectively.
The maximal-margin classifier for such data distribution is
1{z12≥|z12|}, where z1 is the input to the classifier. The data
distribution and the associated maximal-margin classifier is
shown in Figure 3.
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This maximal-margin classifier can be represented by a
ReLU network with single hidden layer as 1{h2(z1)≥0},
where h2(z1) = W2σ(W1z1), and
W1 =

1 0
−1 0
0 1
0 −1
 ,W2 = [−1 −1 1 −1] . (13)
Claim 1 (Convex relaxation can be tight when unstable neu-
rons exist). The solution to the relaxed problem 7 is feasible
for the original non-convex problem O of the aforemen-
tioned ReLU network h2(x0 + δ0) = W2σ(W1(x0 + δ0))
for any x0 ∈ S1 under any perturbation δ0 ∈ {δ|‖δ‖∞ ≤
, 0 <  < b}.
Proof. Both the network and S1 are symmetric in x01, there-
fore it is sufficient to prove the result for x01 ≥ 0.
(1) If x01 ≥ , since x01 ∈ S1, x02 ≥ b + . The 4
neurons in x1 = W1(x0 + δ0) are either non-negative or
non-positive for any δ0 ∈ {δ|‖δ‖∞ ≤ , 0 <  < b} and
the convex relaxation is tight.
(2) If x01 < , for any input sample x0 ∈ {x|x =
[a, c]T , 0 < a < b < b + a ≤ c} ⊆ S1, the optimal
perturbation δ∗O ∈ {δ|‖δ‖∞ ≤ , 0 < a <  < b} can
be inferred from Figure 3 as [,−]T . The corresponding
ReLU activations and the optimal solution are
z′2 = [a+ , 0, c− , 0]T , x′2 = c− a− 2. (14)
Meanwhile, for the relaxed problem, the lower and upper
bounds of the hidden neurons x1 = W1z1 are
x1 = [a− ,−a− , c− ,−c− ]T ,
x¯1 = [a+ ,−a+ , c+ ,−c+ ]T .
Therefore, the first 2 hidden neurons are unstable neurons,
and the convex relaxation we are using will relax the ReLU
operation z2 = σ(x1) into z2 = D1x1 + δ1, where D1 is
a diagonal matrix, and δ1 are slack variables bounded by
0 ≤ δ1 ≤ δ¯1. The diagonal entries of D1 and the upper
bounds δ¯1 are defined by Eq. 5 as
diag(D1) =
[
a+ 
2
,
−a+ 
2
, 1, 0
]
,
δ¯1 =
[
(−a+ )(a+ )
2
,
(−a+ )(a+ )
2
, 0, 0
]T
,
i.e., δ13 and δ14 are always 0. The relaxed linear net-
work, as defined by the constraints in Eq. C with our spe-
cific relaxation, is now determined as x2 = h2(z1) =
W2(D1W1(x + δ0) + δ1). It can be written into the same
form as Eq. 6 as
ctx2 = cth2(z1) = ctW2D1W1(x+ δ0) + ctW2δ1 (15)
= ctW2:1x+ ctW2:1δ0 + ctW2δ1, (16)
where
ct = 1,W2:1 = [−a

, 1].
Therefore, to minimize the term ctW2:1δ0, we
should choose δ∗0 = [,−]T , which is equal
to δ∗O. To minimize ctW2δ1, we should let
δ∗1 =
[
(−a+)(a+)
2 ,
(−a+)(a+)
2 , 0, 0
]
, which gives
rise to the optimal solution of the relaxed problem as
z∗2 = D1W1(x+δ
∗
0)+δ
∗
1 = [a+, 0, c−, 0]T , x∗2 = c−a−2,
the same as the optimal solution of the original non-convex
problem given in Eq. 14. This shows both of the regularizers,
in this case instantiated as
d(x, δ∗0 ,W1,W2) = ct(x
′
2 − x∗2), r(x, δ∗0 ,W1,W2)
=
1
2
(|x′11 − x∗11|+ |x′12 − x∗12|) ,
are able to reach 0 for certain networks and samples when
non-stable neurons exist.
It might seem that adding d(x, δ∗0 ,W, b) = p
′
O(x, δ
∗
0)− p∗C
as a regularizer into the loss function will undesirably min-
imize the margin p′O(x, δ
∗
0) for the ReLU network. The-
oretically, however, it is not the case, since min p′O − p∗C
is a different optimization problem from neither min p′O
nor max p∗C . In fact, the non-negative d(x, δ
∗
0 ,W, b) could
be minimized to 0 with both p′O and p
∗
C taking large val-
ues. In the illustrative example, it is easy to see that for
any x0 ∈ {x|x = [a, c]T , 0 < a < b < b + a ≤ c},
d(x, δ∗0 ,W, b) = ct(x
′
2 − x∗2) = 0, but p′O = p∗C =
c− a− 2 > 0 when  < b2 .
Moreover, since we are maximizing p∗C via the robust cross
entropy loss2 while minimizing the non-negative difference
p′O − p∗C , the overall objective tends to converge to a state
where both p′O and p
∗
C are large.
F. Difficulties in Adapting IBP for `2
Adversary
The Inverval Bound Propagation (IBP) method discussed
here is defined in the same way as (Gowal et al., 2018),
where the bound of the margins are computed layer-wise
from the input layer to the final layer, and the bound of each
neuron is considered independently for both bounding that
neuron and using its inverval to bound other neurons.
2The cross entropy loss on top of the lower bounds of margins
to all non-ground-truth classes, see Eq. 15.
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It is natural to apply IBP against `∞ adversaries, since each
neurons are allowed to change independently in its interval,
which is similar to the `∞ ball. One way to generalize IBP
to other `p norms is to modify the bound propagation in the
first layer, such that any of its output neuron (i) is bounded
by an interval centered at x1i = W1,ix+ b1,i with a radius
of p‖W1,i‖p∗ , where x1i the clean image x’s response, and
W1,i is the first layer’s linear transform corresponding to the
neuron, and ‖·‖p∗ is the dual norm of ‖·‖p, with 1p + 1p∗ = 1.
We refer to this approach IBP(`p, p). Here by the example
of `2 norm, we show such an adaptation may not be able to
obtain a robust convolutional neural network compared with
established results, such as reaching 61% certified accuracy
on CIFAR10 with 2 = 0.25 (Cohen et al., 2019).
Specifically, for adversaries within the `2-ball B2,2(x),
IBP(`2, 2) computes the upper and lower bounds as
x¯21i = W1,ix+ 2‖W1,i‖2 + b1,i,
x21i = W1,ix− 2‖W1,i‖2 + b1,i. (17)
By comparison, for some adversary within the `∞-ball
B∞,∞(x), IBP(`∞, ∞) computes the upper and lower
bounds as
x¯∞1i = W1,ix+ ∞‖W1,i‖1 + b1,i,
x∞1i = W1,ix− ∞‖W1,i‖1 + b1,i. (18)
Since the two approaches are identical in the following
layers, to analyze the best-case results of IBP(`2, 2) based
on established results of IBP(`∞, ∞), it suffices to compare
the results of IBP(`∞, ∞) with ∞ set to some value such
that the range x¯∞1 − x∞1 of Eq. 18 is majorized by the range
x¯21 − x21 of Eq. 17. In this way, we are assuming a weaker
adversary for IBP(`∞, ∞) than the original IBP(`2, 2),
so its certified accuracy is an upper bound of IBP(`2, 2).
Therefore, it suffices to let
∞‖W1,i‖1 ≤ 2‖W1,i‖2, ∀i = 1, 2, ..., n1. (19)
For any W1,i ∈ Rd, we have ‖W1,i‖1 ≤
√
d‖W1,i‖2. To
make Eq. 19 hold for any W1,i ∈ Rd, we can set
∞ =
1√
d
2.
In general, d is equal to the data dimension, such as 3072
for the CIFAR10 dataset. However, for convolutional neu-
ral networks, the first layer is usually convolutional layers
and W1,i is a 3072-dimensional sparse vector with at most
k × k × 3 non-zero entries at fixed positions for convolu-
tion kernels with size k and input images with 3 channels.
In (Zhang et al., 2020; Gowal et al., 2018; Wong et al.,
2018), k = 3 for their major results. In this case,
∞ ≥ 1
3
√
3
2. (20)
Under such assumptions, for 2 = 0.25, the certified accu-
racy of IBP(`2, 0.25) on CIFAR10 should be upper bounded
by IBP(`∞, 0.04811), unless changing the first layer bounds
into `∞ norm based bounds significantly harms the perfor-
mance.3 The best available results of certified accuracies
are 33.06% for IBP(`∞, 0.03137) and 23.20% for IBP(`∞,
0.06275) (Zhang et al., 2020). Comparing with the estab-
lished results from (Cohen et al., 2019) (61%), we can
conclude the certified accuracy of IBP(`2, 0.25) is at least
27.93% to 37.80% lower than the best available results,
since we are assuming a weaker adversary.
IBP(`2, 2) is also not as good as the results with convex
relaxation from (Wong et al., 2018), where the best single-
model (with projection as approximation) certified accuracy
with 2 = 36/255 is 51.09%. For IBP, this adversary is no
weaker than ∞ = 6.9282/255. The best available results
for IBP(`∞, 2/255) and IBP(`∞, 8/255) are 50.02% (Gowal
et al., 2018) and 33.06% (Zhang et al., 2020) respectively,
which indicates the certified accuracy of IBP(`2, 36/255)
is at least 1.07% to 18.03% worse (much loser to 18.03%)
than the approximated version of convex relaxation under
the same `2 adversary.
3Which is unlikely, since ∞ is now a weaker adversary than
2 and the difference in gradient expression only appears in the
first layer.
